


Forgotten Pain: An Untold Story of the Korean War
(Won Kwang Paik & Hope Elizabeth May)

OBJECTIVE: To discuss the importance of the tragedy at No Gun Ri, an incident where refugees were sacrificed by U.S. soldiers, an untold story related to the Korean War



I. Introduction to “Forgotten Pain” (English translation of Chung Eun Yong’s novel, *Do You Know Our Pain?* (*Geudae, uriui apeumeul aneunga*))

- A. Significance of Title (WKP explains both Korean and English titles), the original title in Korean more accurately means “You, know our pain” and since the Korean War is often referred to as the “Forgotten War”, we titled the English version of Chung’s novel as “Forgotten Pain” with the subtitle or “Forgotten Untold Pain of the Korean War.”
- B. WKP briefly discusses why the English translation is important. The incident was concealed and unacknowledged for nearly half a century and we only seek to tell the truth about the incident to ensure that such tragedies are not repeated in human history.
- C. HEM briefly discusses why the English translation is important.
- D. WKP explains the basis for the belief that U.S. soldiers were in a threat situation.
 1. Time lines.
 - Battle of Daejeon (July 16-20, 1950)
 - Battle of YeongDong (July 22-25)
 - No Gun Ri (July 25-29).

Things progressed rapidly, in 13 days, like falling dominos, North Korean People’s Army (KPA) swiftly defeated the U.S. troops causing high casualties (about 2,000 killed, wounded and missing) who were unprepared, under armed, and chaos in retreats.

2. Refugees with KPA infiltrators, in civilian clad who were fueled by the Bodo League Massacre at the Daejeon prison (3,000 South Korean leftist prisoners were shot), would form roadblocks in the US troops rear area and use hidden communication equipment to inform their higher commands. Chung (2025:181) notes “These disguised soldiers from the People’s Army disguised as evacuees entered the battlefield, inflicted heavy losses on American soldiers, and contributed to the fall of Daejeon. This continued in Yongdong, as noted by Appleman (1998:199) “The large number of refugees crowding the Yongdong area helped KPA infiltrate the 1st Cavalry Division position.

3. Order to shoot refugees. Shoot first, order came down to fire to approaching refugees. Hanley (2012:83) wrote; “No refugees to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross the line. Use discretion in case of women and children.” Chung (2025:181) wrote “Since PKA had inflicted so much damage on fellow American soldiers, I wondered if it might have triggered resentment and a desire for revenge against the enemy.” Furthermore, Commanding General Walker told Major General Gay of 1st Cavalry Division, “Protect Yongdong. Remember there are no friendly troops behind you. You must keep your own back door open.”

E. HEM refers to Chapter 6, page 178, and accompanying footnote for further support:

“Ah, that’s right. We were in No Gun Ri, kicking the bastard American soldiers’ asses. When we went into the tunnel, many comrades were killed by those bastards, and the area was littered with dead bodies. A few comrades were still alive in the tunnel, so we saved them. We found a newborn baby suckling from its dead mother’s breast and handed it over to a woman from a neighboring village. Those American bastards are worse than animals. Comrades, are you hungry? Come, join us and eat with us.” He led Gu-Shik and the others deeper into the orchard*

**Eun Yong Chung’s original text uses ‘dongmoo’ here, which is Communist lingo for ‘comrade soldier,’—suggesting that Communist infiltrators were in the tunnel. Elsewhere in the text, Chung uses more ‘neutral’ terms like dongji and jeondeul (‘fellow soldiers’). [H.E.M.]*

II. HEM: The No Gun Ri incident forces us to look at many things, one of which is the moral relevance of calculation, reasoning, judgment. Especially when things are complicated (mixed targets, perfidy).

Consider this exchange from the 2001 U.S. Press Conference on the U.S. Report on the No Gun Ri Incident (see video at <http://www.archetypesofvirtue.com/Day2/>):

Q: In the executive summary, it says on the issue of firing on civilians, it says, "the deaths and injuries of civilians, wherever they occurred, were **an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war** and not a deliberate killing." How can you say these were not deliberate killings?

Cragin: I think the intent of that statement is that the soldiers were not aiming at innocent civilians for the purpose of killing innocent civilians. What they perceived was a threat to themselves. And **believing a threat situation**, recalling again the environment that these young men were dealing with infiltrators coming in through refugee columns et cetera, that they believed they were in a threat situation. That is not the deliberate and intentional determination to kill an innocent non-combatant. And I think that's the distinction that's being drawn.

Q: If a person is pulling a trigger at people in civilian clothes, and the bullet goes out and hit these people, isn't that a deliberate act by definition? How can that be a non-deliberate act?

Cragin: I think if they're pulling a trigger at people in civilian clothes and they believe, for example, that people in civilian clothes have been firing at them, and they have a very substantial history in the early period of the war of having North Korean People's Army personnel pose as civilians... that's a different distinction than saying here is somebody who is clearly an innocent, noncombatant civilian.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is simply believing that a threat situation existed a sufficient justification for the killing of civilians? Should there be a “rational basis” for this belief? Was there as a rational basis for this belief that a threat situation existed?

2. In Chapter 5 (“Two-Faced American Soldiers”) Chung’s wife pleaded “What are these American soldiers who kill on one side and heal on the other? What are they?” (p. 160). Is this a sign of “Moral Injury” or something else?